So just logged in and it told me that someone from my "Neighbour" City logged into already into my Account, i didn't thought any bad about it and let the System sent me a new Password. After i typed it in and entered the Char Selection i saw already the bad outcome of this.. my HC Char died it seems and was set back into the Default League and also some Items are missing.. so how am i suppose to fix that Problem now ? I mean the Char is just lvl 49 but it would be the 3rd Time already that i have to level a new Char then in HC just because someone was able to get into my Account..
And on the side, my Password isn't easy and is also kinda a longer one, so i assume because GGG just got a Service Team of 8 Employeès means that i won't have any chance to get my Char back atleast to the Hardcore League am i right ?
Regards , dcHu.
No offense, but really???
The no-return policy is more about the abusive nature of people than an "under-staffed" customer support...
Exiled for Eternity
Last edited by smartybarty#6389 on Feb 22, 2013, 11:45:58 AM
The first security feature introduced today is that saved passwords only work from the IP that they were saved on. Some users have commented that they want the saved passwords to work from any IP, so we're considering allowing that as an option if the user wants to risk their account for this convenience.
I hope this option will arrive soon!!
Please read: http://www.pathofexile.com/forum/view-thread/181712/page/1/#p1597167!
Last edited by SonicSonedit#7207 on Feb 22, 2013, 11:54:10 AM
I'm no tech expert, but would it be possible to limit access to accounts to the Mac Adress?
That's something unique, right? At least, that's how I whitelist the access to my WLAN. Don't know if that'd work for other things aswell.
CliveHowlitzer wrote:
I am now too addicted to that feeling of being kicked in the nuts when you die.
I'm no tech expert, but would it be possible to limit access to accounts to the Mac Adress?
That's something unique, right? At least, that's how I whitelist the access to my WLAN. Don't know if that'd work for other things aswell.
True. It's not like someone knows your MAC unless they visit your home.
Cloning the MAC is easy.
Find out what the MAC address is is slightly more difficult. Just visiting a website won't give them that information, nor will having some sort of password logger.
Once again, it will surprise you as to how easy it is to gain access to 90% of people's computers for one reason or another. For example, there are still many people today that are using a Windows OS built on an x86 (32-bit) architecture. Those of us in the security community know that this is filled with more holes than swiss cheese lmao! Most ppl today just walk around, la la la, and have no clue just how vulnerable their systems really are; due to no diligence via computer security, just ignorant of technology or being completely left in the dark by the evil forces of Microcrap, uh I mean Microsoft. You think I'm kidding?
Wow, this is a biggie. A vulnerability exists in all 32-bit versions of Microsoft Windows released since 1993, and is in what's known as the Virtual DOS Machine. This was introduced in 1993 to provide backwards compatibility with old 16-bit programs, and has been carried forward ever since, even into Windows 7.
By using the old MS-DOS system, a "hacker" can inject code directly into the system's kernel. This fairly much overrides all security and makes it easy to make changes to any part of the operating system. The exploit has been tested, and works, on all 32-bit versions of Windows except for version 3.1 (NT).
If a 16-bit piece of code is run, under the Windows Task Manager you will probably see both NTVDM.EXE and WOWEXEC.EXE running. NTVDM.EXE is the Windows 16-bit Virtual DOS Machine, and is used for providing a 16-bit environment for old 16-bit applications (Windows and MS-DOS). WOWEXEC.EXE (which stands for Window On Window Execution) provides additional 16-bit support, and is launched by NTVDM if it is needed.
Disabling the MSDOS and WOWEXEC subsystems will prevent an attack from functioning. But this will also stop any 16-bit programs from working, and this includes any 32-bit programs that might call some older 16-bit code.
Details of how to turn off the 16-bit subsystem are under the "Mitigation" section here:
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Jan/341
It should be noted there is no known use of this security hole currently being used. Also, you could "break" some of your software if you just switch off the MSDOS and WOWEXEC subsystems.
The person who found this security hole reported it to Microsoft last summer. But he got tired of waiting for Microsoft to do something about it, and released the details into the wild.
Spoiler
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Jan/341
Microsoft Windows NT #GP Trap Handler Allows Users to Switch Kernel Stack
From: Tavis Ormandy <taviso () sdf lonestar org>
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2010 20:11:17 +0100
Microsoft Windows NT #GP Trap Handler Allows Users to Switch Kernel Stack
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
CVE-2010-0232
In order to support BIOS service routines in legacy 16bit applications, the
Windows NT Kernel supports the concept of BIOS calls in the Virtual-8086 mode
monitor code. These are implemented in two stages, the kernel transitions to
the second stage when the #GP trap handler (nt!KiTrap0D) detects that the
faulting cs:eip matches specific magic values.
Transitioning to the second stage involves restoring execution context and
call stack (which had been previously saved) from the faulting trap frame once
authenticity has been verified.
This verification relies on the following incorrect assumptions:
- Setting up a VDM context requires SeTcbPrivilege.
- ring3 code cannot install arbitrary code segment selectors.
- ring3 code cannot forge a trap frame.
This is believed to affect every release of the Windows NT kernel, from
Windows NT 3.1 (1993) up to and including Windows 7 (2009).
Working out the details of the attack is left as an exercise for the reader.
Just kidding, that was an homage to Derek Soeder :-)
- Assumption 0: Setting up a VDM context requires SeTcbPrivilege.
Creating a VDM context requires EPROCESS->Flags.VdmAllowed to be set in order
to access the authenticated system service, NtVdmControl(). VdmAllowed can
only be set using NtSetInformationProcess(), which verifies the caller has
SeTcbPrivilege. If this is true, the caller is very privileged and can
certainly be trusted.
This restriction can be subverted by requesting the NTVDM subsystem, and then
using CreateRemoteThread() to execute in the context of the subsystem process,
which will already have this flag set.
Cpl is usually equal to the two least significant bits of cs and ss, and is
a simple way to calculate the privilege of a task. However, there is an
exception, Virtual-8086 mode.
Real mode uses a segmented addressing scheme in order to allow 16-bit
addresses to access the 20-bit address space. This is achieved by forming
physical addresses from a calculation like (cs << 4) + (eip & 0xffff). The
same calculation is used to map the segmented real address space onto the
protected linear address space in Virtual-8086 mode. Therefore, I must be
permitted to set cs to any value, and checks for disallowed or privileged
selectors can be bypassed (PsSetLdtEnties will reject any selector where any
of the three lower bits are unset, as is the case with the required cs pair).
- Assumption 2: ring3 code cannot forge a trap frame.
Returning to usermode with iret is a complicated operation, the pseudocode for
the iret instruction alone spans several pages of Intel's Software Developers
Manual. The operation occurs in two stages, a pre-commit stage and a
post-commit stage. Using the VdmContext installed using NtVdmControl(), an
invalid context can be created that causes iret to fail pre-commit, thus
forging a trap frame.
The final requirement involves predicting the address of the second-stage BIOS
call handler. The address is static in Windows 2003, XP and earlier operating
systems, however, Microsoft introduced kernel base randomisation in Windows
Vista. Unfortunately, this potentially useful exploit mitigation is trivial
to defeat locally as unprivileged users can simply query the loaded module list
via NtQuerySystemInformation().
All 32bit x86 versions of Windows NT released since 27-Jul-1993 are believed to
be affected, including but not limited to the following actively supported
versions:
- Windows 2000
- Windows XP
- Windows Server 2003
- Windows Vista
- Windows Server 2008
- Windows 7
Which will reach the following code sequence via the #GP trap handler,
nt!KiTrap0D. Please note how the stack pointer is restored from the saved
(untrusted) trap frame at 43C3E6, undoubtedly resulting in the condition
described above.
/* ... */
.text:0043C3CE Ki386BiosCallReturnAddress proc near
.text:0043C3CE mov eax, large fs:KPCR.SelfPcr
.text:0043C3D4 mov edi, [ebp+KTRAP_FRAME.Esi]
.text:0043C3D7 mov edi, [edi]
.text:0043C3D9 mov esi, [eax+KPCR.NtTib.StackBase]
.text:0043C3DC mov ecx, 84h
.text:0043C3E1 mov [eax+KPCR.NtTib.StackBase], edi
.text:0043C3E4 rep movsd
.text:0043C3E6 mov esp, [ebp+KTRAP_FRAME.Esi]
.text:0043C3E9 add esp, 4
.text:0043C3EC mov ecx, [eax+KPCR.PrcbData.CurrentThread]
.text:0043C3F2 mov [ecx+KTHREAD.InitialStack], edi
.text:0043C3F5 mov eax, [eax+KPCR.TSS]
.text:0043C3F8 sub edi, 220h
.text:0043C3FE mov [eax+KTSS.Esp0], edi
.text:0043C401 pop edx
.text:0043C402 mov [ecx+KTHREAD.Teb], edx
.text:0043C405 pop edx
.text:0043C406 mov large fs:KPCR.NtTib.Self, edx
.text:0043C40D mov ebx, large fs:KPCR.GDT
.text:0043C414 mov [ebx+3Ah], dx
.text:0043C418 shr edx, 10h
.text:0043C41B mov byte ptr [ebx+3Ch], dl
.text:0043C41E mov [ebx+3Fh], dh
.text:0043C421 sti
.text:0043C422 pop edi
.text:0043C423 pop esi
.text:0043C424 pop ebx
.text:0043C425 pop ebp
.text:0043C426 retn 4
/* ... */
Possibly naive example code for triggering this condition is availble from the
link below.
The code has been tested on Windows XP, Windows Server 2003/2008, Windows Vista
and Windows 7. Support for other affected operating systems is left as an
exercise for the interested reader.
If you believe you may be affected, you should consider applying the workaround
described below.
Temporarily disabling the MSDOS and WOWEXEC subsystems will prevent the attack
from functioning, as without a process with VdmAllowed, it is not possible to
access NtVdmControl() (without SeTcbPrivilege, of course).
The policy template "Windows Components\Application Compatibility\Prevent
access to 16-bit applications" may be used within the group policy editor to
prevent unprivileged users from executing 16-bit applications. I'm informed
this is an officially supported machine configuration.
Administrators unfamiliar with group policy may find the videos below
instructive. Further information is available from the Windows Server
Group Policy Home
To watch a demonstration of this policy being applied to a Windows Server 2003
domain controller, see the link below.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XRVI4iQ2Nug
To watch a demonstration of this policy being applied to a Windows Server 2008
domain controller, see the link below.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8pfXW7crEQ
To watch a demonstration of this policy being applied to a shared but
unjoined Windows XP Professional machine, see the link below.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u7Y6d-BVwxk
On Windows NT4, the following knowledgebase article explains how to disable the
NTVDM and WOWEXEC subsystems.
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/220159
Applying these configuration changes will temporarily prevent users from
accessing legacy 16-bit MS-DOS and Windows 3.1 applications, however, few users
require this functionality.
If you do not require this feature and depend on NT security, consider
permanently disabling it in order to reduce kernel attack surface.
Microsoft was informed about this vulnerability on 12-Jun-2009, and they
confirmed receipt of my report on 22-Jun-2009.
Regrettably, no official patch is currently available. As an effective and easy
to deploy workaround is available, I have concluded that it is in the best
interest of users to go ahead with the publication of this document without an
official patch. It should be noted that very few users rely on NT security, the
primary audience of this advisory is expected to be domain administrators and
security professionals.
Derek Soeder has previously reported some legendary NT bugs, including multiple
vdm bugs that, while unrelated to this issue, make fascinating reading.
- http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2004/Oct/404, Windows VDM #UD LocalPrivilege Escalation
- http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2004/Apr/477, Windows VDM TIB Local Privilege Escalation
- http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2007/Apr/357, Zero Page Race Condition Privilege Escalation
--
-------------------------------------
taviso () sdf lonestar org | finger me for my gpg key.
-------------------------------------------------------
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
I'm no tech expert, but would it be possible to limit access to accounts to the Mac Adress?
That's something unique, right? At least, that's how I whitelist the access to my WLAN. Don't know if that'd work for other things aswell.
True. It's not like someone knows your MAC unless they visit your home.
ARP -A -.-"
Regards
Indestructible, determination that is incorruptible
From the other side, a terror to behold
Annihilation will be unavoidable, every broken enemy will know
That their opponent had to be invincible, take a last look around while you're alive
I'm an indestructible master of war
If player logs in from a different country and enters their unlock code disable trading on their account for say 8-24 hours, this will prevent items being traded off if the hacker also compromised the player's email account.
This will give the player time to realise their account's been hacked and change their passwords without losing any items.
